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North Korea: The Missile Test Launch; Stratfor
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North Korea: The Missile Test Launch
STRATFOR TODAY » April 3, 2009 | 2030 GMT
Summary
As the widely reported April 4-8 launch window for North Korea’s latest missile launch approaches, despite a few ritual condemnations, the overwhelming response from the region and beyond appears to be indifference.
Analysis
Despite the consternation and condemnation surrounding North Korea’s planned satellite launch, set for some time between April 4-8, there is little concrete being done to dissuade Pyongyang’s actions, and the potential for additional sanctions following the launch has little real meaning. Barring a significant accident or miscalculation, it seems North Korea’s neighbors and the United States are simply not placing much significance on the launch. Since North Korea’s 2006 missile and nuclear tests, Pyongyang has found it more difficult to raise the stakes. Its policy of creating crises as the starting point for negotiations appears to be losing efficacy, though they do allow Pyongyang to keep moving the red line.
Since the end of the Cold War, when North Korea lost its ability to play between its two traditional sponsors, China and the Soviet Union, Pyongyang has followed a different policy to protect its interests and avoid the regime collapse seen throughout the communist bloc countries. In short, Pyongyang has engaged in a form of self-created crisis diplomacy. It creates security crises that draw attention from its neighbors and the United States, and then extracts economic and political concessions in return for standing back down to the status quo. This has served North Korea well, and the North Korean leadership has far outlived predictions of its imminent demise.
Over time, however, North Korea’s antics have been viewed more and more like the boy who cried wolf, who raised the alarm for something that was not really threatening. Whereas simply the possession of a nuclear reprocessing facility in the late 1990s almost induced the United States to threaten war, Pyongyang’s 2006 nuclear test — which followed a series of missile tests by a few months — brought only a few strong words and some relatively ineffective sanctions. Similarly, the current “crisis” surrounding North Korea’s planned satellite launch has been more words than actions, and even these have toned down as Washington has said it does not intend to intercept the launch, a sentiment echoed by Tokyo (unless parts of the missile appear likely to land on Japanese territory).
The most likely outcome of this launch, barring an accident, is a few more strongly worded scoldings from the United Nations, coupled with a few additional sanctions. (Japan has already extended its sanctions for a year, though sanctions have proven largely ineffective, particularly as China and even South Korea rarely go along with them.) A few months down the road, there will be talk of resuming the six-party talks and re-engaging North Korea. But for the time being, there are just too many more significant issues to deal with, not the least of which is the continued global economic slump. Pyongyang’s Taepodong test just does not alter any balance of power in the region. So aside from verbal strictures, stronger actions or negotiations can simply be delayed for another day.
In some ways this is not all that bad for North Korea. In the on-again off-again crises, Pyongyang never really returns to the status quo, but slowly gains incremental acceptance for improvements in its own development of a deterrent capability. For North Korea, the nuclear and missile developments are not only bargaining chips, but more concrete deterrents. In theory, dissuading attack due to its nuclear capability will allow it to reduce its dependence upon its neighbors for defense. That in turn could increase the regime’s confidence and security, and allow North Korea to begin experimenting in expanded political and economic ties, leaving space to break out of its self-imposed isolation — or at least to become a more secure recluse.
POSTED FOR FAIR USE:
www.stratfor.com
North Korea: The Launch Occurs
STRATFOR TODAY » April 5, 2009 | 0413 GMT
According to late-breaking reports, North Korea carried out its much-anticipated ballistic missile launch April 5, the second day of an expected four-day launch window; Pyongyang apparently scrubbed the launch April 4 due to high winds. Few details are available, and confirmation of successful insertion of the satellite into orbit has not yet been secured. What is known is that the launch occurred between 11:30 and 11:50 a.m. local time, according to regional authorities. Current reports suggest that the first stage landed in the Sea of Japan 170 miles from Japan, and the second stage landed 790 miles east of Japan in the Pacific Ocean. This is much along the lines of what had been anticipated.
In short, North Korea appears to have launched its satellite launch vehicle. According to Japanese reports, it took off — and thus far there is no reason to doubt these reports. The buildup to the launch on Pyongyang’s part has been deliberate. It has long been clear that it intended to follow through with this launch.
As STRATFOR has noted, this is technically well within Pyongyang’s grasp. While North Korea rarely tests its missile arsenal, it garners much from the tests it does conduct. Even a failure offers much in terms of operational development.
But in this case, Pyongyang is working with nearly a decade of technical expertise. Iran’s successful insertion of a small satellite into orbit in February is a direct result of North Korean influence, and its success is a proof of concept for North Korea’s much more advanced capability. In short, Tehran’s success in February is evidence that Pyongyang has the technical capability to succeed with its April 5 mission.
The United States has confirmed the launch only. There has been no confirmation of the successful insertion of a satellite into orbit. It must be understood that North Korea has the capability to insert a small Sputnik-size satellite into orbit, and that without further information it must be assumed that Pyongyang has succeeded. STRATFOR continues to watch for the test of shorter-range ballistic missiles.
At the moment there is no indication of a successful insertion or any intercept attempt. The trajectory information currently available suggests that the missile performed according to North Korea’s expectations — which would suggest that no previously-defined motivation for an intercept had been met.
www.stratfor.com
North Korea: The Missile Test Launch
STRATFOR TODAY » April 3, 2009 | 2030 GMT
Summary
As the widely reported April 4-8 launch window for North Korea’s latest missile launch approaches, despite a few ritual condemnations, the overwhelming response from the region and beyond appears to be indifference.
Analysis
Despite the consternation and condemnation surrounding North Korea’s planned satellite launch, set for some time between April 4-8, there is little concrete being done to dissuade Pyongyang’s actions, and the potential for additional sanctions following the launch has little real meaning. Barring a significant accident or miscalculation, it seems North Korea’s neighbors and the United States are simply not placing much significance on the launch. Since North Korea’s 2006 missile and nuclear tests, Pyongyang has found it more difficult to raise the stakes. Its policy of creating crises as the starting point for negotiations appears to be losing efficacy, though they do allow Pyongyang to keep moving the red line.
Since the end of the Cold War, when North Korea lost its ability to play between its two traditional sponsors, China and the Soviet Union, Pyongyang has followed a different policy to protect its interests and avoid the regime collapse seen throughout the communist bloc countries. In short, Pyongyang has engaged in a form of self-created crisis diplomacy. It creates security crises that draw attention from its neighbors and the United States, and then extracts economic and political concessions in return for standing back down to the status quo. This has served North Korea well, and the North Korean leadership has far outlived predictions of its imminent demise.
Over time, however, North Korea’s antics have been viewed more and more like the boy who cried wolf, who raised the alarm for something that was not really threatening. Whereas simply the possession of a nuclear reprocessing facility in the late 1990s almost induced the United States to threaten war, Pyongyang’s 2006 nuclear test — which followed a series of missile tests by a few months — brought only a few strong words and some relatively ineffective sanctions. Similarly, the current “crisis” surrounding North Korea’s planned satellite launch has been more words than actions, and even these have toned down as Washington has said it does not intend to intercept the launch, a sentiment echoed by Tokyo (unless parts of the missile appear likely to land on Japanese territory).
The most likely outcome of this launch, barring an accident, is a few more strongly worded scoldings from the United Nations, coupled with a few additional sanctions. (Japan has already extended its sanctions for a year, though sanctions have proven largely ineffective, particularly as China and even South Korea rarely go along with them.) A few months down the road, there will be talk of resuming the six-party talks and re-engaging North Korea. But for the time being, there are just too many more significant issues to deal with, not the least of which is the continued global economic slump. Pyongyang’s Taepodong test just does not alter any balance of power in the region. So aside from verbal strictures, stronger actions or negotiations can simply be delayed for another day.
In some ways this is not all that bad for North Korea. In the on-again off-again crises, Pyongyang never really returns to the status quo, but slowly gains incremental acceptance for improvements in its own development of a deterrent capability. For North Korea, the nuclear and missile developments are not only bargaining chips, but more concrete deterrents. In theory, dissuading attack due to its nuclear capability will allow it to reduce its dependence upon its neighbors for defense. That in turn could increase the regime’s confidence and security, and allow North Korea to begin experimenting in expanded political and economic ties, leaving space to break out of its self-imposed isolation — or at least to become a more secure recluse.
POSTED FOR FAIR USE:
www.stratfor.com
North Korea: The Launch Occurs
STRATFOR TODAY » April 5, 2009 | 0413 GMT
According to late-breaking reports, North Korea carried out its much-anticipated ballistic missile launch April 5, the second day of an expected four-day launch window; Pyongyang apparently scrubbed the launch April 4 due to high winds. Few details are available, and confirmation of successful insertion of the satellite into orbit has not yet been secured. What is known is that the launch occurred between 11:30 and 11:50 a.m. local time, according to regional authorities. Current reports suggest that the first stage landed in the Sea of Japan 170 miles from Japan, and the second stage landed 790 miles east of Japan in the Pacific Ocean. This is much along the lines of what had been anticipated.
In short, North Korea appears to have launched its satellite launch vehicle. According to Japanese reports, it took off — and thus far there is no reason to doubt these reports. The buildup to the launch on Pyongyang’s part has been deliberate. It has long been clear that it intended to follow through with this launch.
As STRATFOR has noted, this is technically well within Pyongyang’s grasp. While North Korea rarely tests its missile arsenal, it garners much from the tests it does conduct. Even a failure offers much in terms of operational development.
But in this case, Pyongyang is working with nearly a decade of technical expertise. Iran’s successful insertion of a small satellite into orbit in February is a direct result of North Korean influence, and its success is a proof of concept for North Korea’s much more advanced capability. In short, Tehran’s success in February is evidence that Pyongyang has the technical capability to succeed with its April 5 mission.
The United States has confirmed the launch only. There has been no confirmation of the successful insertion of a satellite into orbit. It must be understood that North Korea has the capability to insert a small Sputnik-size satellite into orbit, and that without further information it must be assumed that Pyongyang has succeeded. STRATFOR continues to watch for the test of shorter-range ballistic missiles.
At the moment there is no indication of a successful insertion or any intercept attempt. The trajectory information currently available suggests that the missile performed according to North Korea’s expectations — which would suggest that no previously-defined motivation for an intercept had been met.
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